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LRCoin: Leakage-resilient Cryptocurrency
Based on Bitcoin for Data Trading in IoT
Yong Yu∗, Yujie Ding, Yanqi Zhao, Yannan Li∗, Yi Zhao, Xiaojiang Du, Mohsen Guizani
Abstract—Currently, the number of Internet of Thing (IoT) devices making up the IoT is more than 11 billion and this number has been
continuously increasing. The prevalence of these devices leads to an emerging IoT business model called Device-as-a-service(DaaS),
which enables sensor devices to collect data disseminated to all interested devices. The devices sharing data with other devices could
receive some financial reward such as Bitcoin. However, side-channel attacks, which aim to exploit some information leaked from the
IoT devices during data trade execution, are possible since most of the IoT devices are vulnerable to be hacked or compromised. Thus,
it is challenging to securely realize data trading in IoT environment due to the information leakage such as leaking the private key for
signing a Bitcoin transaction in Bitcoin system. In this paper, we propose LRCoin, a kind of leakage-resilient cryptocurrency based on
bitcoin in which the signature algorithm used for authenticating bitcoin transactions is leakage-resilient. LRCoin is suitable for the
scenarios where information leakage is inevitable such as IoT applications. Our core contribution is proposing an efficient
bilinear-based continual-leakage-resilient ECDSA signature. We prove the proposed signature algorithm is unforgeable against
adaptively chosen messages attack in the generic bilinear group model under the continual leakage setting. Both the theoretical
analysis and the implementation demonstrate the practicability of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Leakage Resilient Signature, Data Trading, The Generic Bilinear Group Model.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE Internet of Thing (IoT) has emerged as an area ofincredible potential and impact. According to Gartner
Inc. [1], more than 11 billion IoT devices have been con-
nected to the IoT network in 2018. The number of these
devices is continuously increasing and is expected to be 20
billion by 2020. The application of IoT pervades everywhere
from smart home, smart cities, manufacturing, commerce,
education to supply chain, logistics and almost anything
we can imagine [2] - [7]. The opportunities presented by
IoT raise an emerging IoT business model pattern Device-
as-a-service(DaaS). We can employ the sensor devices to
collect data which would be vended to all interested users or
devices. For example, the owner of personal weather station
not only uses the IoT devices to control his household
heating, but share the data to neighborhood for obtaining
financial incentives.
However, most of these IoT devices are easy to be
hacked or compromised by various cyber attacks such as
a side channel attack. Due to this attack, the secret key in
IoT devices might be leaked and then adversaries could
successfully forge valid signatures to transfer bitcoins from
those devices to other accounts. Actually, ten thefts of over
10,000 BTC each and more than 34 crimes of stealing acci-
dents over 1000 BTC each since 2011 happened [8]. It was
reported by Kaspersky labs that about one million infections
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per month of malware designed to search for secret keys
and steal bitcoins were detected [8]. Dubbed Satori IoT
Botnet exploits zero-day to zombify Huawei Routers and
was found infecting more than 200,000 IP addresses in just
12 hours [9]. Cisco’s Talos cyber intelligence units discov-
ered an advanced piece of IoT botnet malware, dubbed
VPNFilter, that was designed with versatile capabilities to
gather intelligence, interfere with internet communications,
as well as conduct destructive cyber attack operations. The
malware infected over 500,000 devices in at least 54 coun-
tries, most of which are small and home offices routers and
internet-connected storage devices from Linksys, MikroTik,
NETGEAR, and TP-Link. Some network-attached storage
devices were targeted by the malware as well [10]. To sum
up, the security of IoT devices was degraded due to a
variety of factors, and the increasing IoT applications based
on Bitcoin leads to an urgent need for more secure bitcoin
transactions [11].
Blockchain was firstly introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto
in Bitcoin white paper [12]. A blockchain is a hash-based
data structure. Each block has a block header, a hash pointer
to the previous block and a Merkle hash tree (MHT) that
digests of transactions in the block. A blockchain makes
use of two well-known cryptographic techniques, namely
digital signatures and hash functions. A digital signature is
employed to provide the integrity, non-repudiation and au-
thentication of bitcoin transactions. A hash function is used
to compute a hash value of the previous block and make the
blocks as a chain. The decentralization of blockchain benefits
IoT in many applications such as access control to data [13],
data trading [14], and key management [15]- [18] in IoT etc.
Related Work. Noyen et al. [14] discussed how sensing-
as-a-service can benefit from Bitcoin and described the
process of exchanging data for cash via Bitcoin. Zhou et
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
11
17
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
6 O
ct 
20
18
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 2
al. [19] presented distributed data vending on blockchain
by combining data embedding and similarity learning. This
approach brings the trade-off between the effectiveness of
data retrieval and leakage risk from indexing the data. Leiba
et al. [20] used blockchain as a decentralized IoT software
update delivery network in which participating nodes as
distributors are compensated by vendors with digital cur-
rency for delivering updates to devices. Delgado-Segura et
al [21] introduced a fair protocol for data trading based on
Bitcoin script language and double ECDSA. In practically,
the script language operator was disabled for Bitcoin trans-
action. Kopp et al. [22] presented KopperCoin, a distributed
file storage system with financial incentives. Later, Kopp
et al. proposed privacy-preserving distributed file storage
system with financial incentives [23], which takes advan-
tages of ring signatures and one-time addresses to realize
a privacy-preserving payment mechanism. However, these
solutions provide no confidentiality and reliability of data
in the context of side channel attacks.
Our Contributions. Blockchain is subject to side-channel
attacks due to the openness of its deployment. As a conse-
quence, information leakage especially secret key leakage
is possible in various IoT applications. In this paper, we
propose a new kind of cryptocurrency named LRCoin which
is secure even part of the signing key of a user is exposed.
LRCoin can be used in the applications where secret key
leakage is inevitable such as the payment of data trading
in IoT. We propose a concrete construction of an efficient
bilinear pairing-based continual leakage-resilient ECDSA
signature algorithm as the building block for signing trans-
actions in LRCoin. The proposed signature algorithm is
proven unforgeable against adaptively chosen messages
attack in the presence of continual leakage setting. The secu-
rity proof is conducted in the generic bilinear group model
to bypass the impossible results that achieving continual
leakage-resilience cryptographic protocols whose secret key
is uniquely determined by the corresponding public key.
We also implement the proposed signature algorithm on
laptops and phones respectively, which demonstrates that
its efficiency is comparable with that of the original ECDSA
signature.
2 DATA TRADING MODEL IN IOT
Data trading [24], [25] is the exchange of bitcoin for
data collected by IoT devices between data seller and data
buyer. The market is to establish a platform for data seller to
use blockchains as infrastructures to sell the data. The data
buyer can retrieve data from blockchain and complement
the payment. In this section, we introduce the data trading
model in IoT and the key components. The participants
involved in data trading model in IoT include Data Sellers,
Trade Market (Blockchain Network, Storage Server), Data
Buyers, as shown in Fig.1.
Data seller: A data seller is a user who owns the data
and wants to sell the data.
Trade market: The trade market is composed of
blockchain network and storage server. The blockchain
network provides data sellers and data buyers a trading
platform. The storage server provides data sellers and data
Fig. 1: Data Trading Model in IoT
buyers an intermediate facility to upload data and down-
load data respectively.
Data buyer: A data buyer submits Purchase Transactions
to the trade market to match the corresponding Sale Trans-
actions. A data buyer generates a payment transaction for
data she wants to buy and downloads the data from the
storage sever.
Sale Transaction: A data seller constructs a Sale Transac-
tion with the topic that he has some data to sell and then
broadcasts the transaction to the trade market and uploads
the data to the storage server. A sale transaction consists of
the topic of the data, the intended price of selling the data
etc.
Purchase Transaction: A data buyer constructs a pur-
chase transaction with the topic of the data that she wants
to buy and then broadcasts the transaction to data market.
A purchase transaction consists of the topic of the data, the
intended price of buying the data etc.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we recall some preliminaries used in
this paper, including bilinear maps, leakage-resilient models
and the security model for continual leakage-resilient digital
signatures.
3.1 Bilinear Maps
LetG =< g >,GT =< gT > be two multiplicative cyclic
groups of prime order p with k bits. A map [26] e : G×G→
GT is called a bilinear map if the follow conditions holds.
Bilinearity. For all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) =
e(u, v)ab.
Non-Degeneracy. e(g, g) 6= 1GT , the identity element of
GT .
Efficient Computation. e(u, v) can be computed in poly-
nomial time.
3.2 Stateful Signatures
In order to achieve continual leakage resilience when a
significant bits of secret key are leaked during each round
of computations, it is necessary to let the secret key stateful.
That is, the secret key must be refreshed after each round
of signature computation. Otherwise, the secret key would
eventually be completely exposed. Galindo and Vivek [27]
suggested to split the secret key into two parts and reserve
them on two distinct parts of a device memory. Specifically,
they divide a signature computation into two steps. In each
step, the memory in use is divided into two parts called
the active part and the passive part. The active part of the
memory is the memory being accessed by the computation
while other parts of the memory are the passive part. It is
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assumed that information leakage is only possible in the
active part at any specified time.
There are four polynomial-time algorithms namely
KeyGen, Sign1, Sign2, V erify in a stateful signature
scheme. Different from the key generation of traditional
digital signatures which generates a single secret key, the
key generation algorithm in a stateful signature outputs
two initial secret states (S0, S′0). The two signing algorithms
Sign1, Sign2 are executed sequentially to generate a signa-
ture on a message m. A bit more specific, the i-th round of
the signature computation is performed as follows.
Sign1(Si−1,mi, ri)→ (Si, wi),
Sign2(S
′
i−1, wi, r
′
i)→ (S′i, σi),
where ri and r′i denote the random values used in Sign1
and Sign2 respectively. wi denotes the state information de-
livered to Sign2 by Sign1. Then the secret state is updated
from (Si−1, S′i−1) to (Si, S
′
i). The signature of mi is σi.
The formal definition of a stateful signature Π =
(KeyGen, Sign1, Sign2, V erify) is as follows.
• KeyGen(k): On input a security parameter k, it out-
puts a key pair (pk, (S0, S′0)) where pk is public key
and (S0, S′0) are two shares of the secret key.
• Sign1(Si−1,mi): On input the first part of the (i−1)th
secret key Si−1 and message mi, it selects a random-
ness ri and updates Si−1 into Si and computes the
state information wi, which would be passed onto
Sign2.
• Sign2(S′i−1, wi): On input the second part of the
(i − 1)th secret key S′i−1 and state information wi,
it chooses a randomness r′i and updates S
′
i−1 into S
′
i
and computes the ith signature σi.
• Verify(pk, σi,mi): On input the public key pk, sig-
nature σi and message mi, it outputs a bit b = 1
meaning valid, or b = 0 meaning invalid.
3.3 Existential Unforgeability with Leakage
A cryptographic primitive is called leakage-resilient if
it is secure even the adversary additionally obtains some
side-channel information, that is leakage. A variety of leak-
age models [31] [32] [33] have been proposed to model
side-channel attacks and formalize the security for diverse
cryptographic primitives. In 2004, Micali and Reyzin [32]
gave a leakage model namely “only computation leaks
information (OCLI)”, saying that only the secret memory
which is involved in computation at that time leaks infor-
mation. And they noted that the leakage amount during
each computation is bounded. Otherwise, the adversary
continually obtains leakage from many computations, and
finally the adversary is able to obtain the full knowledge of
the secret key. In 2009, Akavia et al. [34] introduced a general
leakage model called “bounded-memory leakage model”. In
this model, an adversary is allowed to adaptively choose
an efficiently computable a leakage function f and send
it to a leakage oracle. The adversary obtains f(sk) from
the leakage oracle where sk denotes the secret key of the
target user. However, the overall output length of all the
leakage functions is bounded by a parameter λ, which is
smaller than the secret key sk. But this model does not cover
the continuous memory leakage, which could been given
rise to due to various side channel attacks. In 2010, Zvika
et al. [29] and Dodis et al. [30] formalized a “continual-
memory leakage model”. This model is similar to the OCLI
model except that in this model the leakage is assumed
from the entire secret memory whether or not the memory
is involved in computation.
Galindo and Vivek [27] presented an approach to model
the leakage in a signature generation by allowing an ad-
versary A to access to a leakage oracle Ωleaksecretkey(·). It not
only gives A signatures of messages choosen by A but
also allows A to obtain leakage from the current signature
computation. More precisely, let λ be the leakage parameter,
and A is allowed to adaptively select two efficiently com-
puted leakage functions fi() → {0, 1}λ and hi → {0, 1}λ
during every round of signature generation. Specifically, the
inputs of leakage functions fi and hi are a part of the secret
key respectively, and the outputs of leakage are denoted as
Λi = fi(·),Λ′i = hi(·). Galindo and Vivek noted that A can
determine hi after seeing Λi. But for simplicity, they only
define the leakage model in which fi and hi are specified
along with the messagemi when they are sent to the leakage
oracles.
The property of unforgeability of a stateful signature
scheme Π = (KeyGen, Sign1, Sign2, V erify) with con-
tinual leakage is defined by the following game between
a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. The challenger C runs the key generation
algorithm KeyGen(1k) to obtain a public pair key
pk and the initial secret key (S0, S′0)). pk is given to
A. C sets a counter i = 1 and a set of ω =  where
i denotes the ith round of the signature query and
ω is the set of messages which have been signed by
querying the Sign-Leak oracle below.
• Sign-Leak Queries. Given with the public parameter
pk the adversaries A can query a Sign-Leak Ora-
cle A
Ωleak
Si−1,S′i−1
(mi,fi,hi)
(pk) at most q numbers of
signatures of messages (m1, m2, ... mi) ∈ [0, 1]∗
adaptively chosen by A (i < q). When A queries the
Sign-Leak Oracle, If |fi| 6= λ or |hi| 6= λ the oracle
would return ⊥ and then abort. Otherwise the oracle
would response A with a signature σi by computing
Sign1(Si−1,mi)
ri→ (Si, wi) and Sign2(S′i−1, wi)
r′i→
(S′i, σi). During each such signature computation,
the adversaries A could also get some knowledge
about the internal secret key from the leakage func-
tions fi and hi functioning by Λi = fi(Si−1, ri)
and Λ′i = hi(S
′
i−1, r
′
i, wi). After each such query, the
counter i is increased to i+ 1 and the messages set is
enlarged by ω
⋃
mi. Eventually the Sign-Leak Oracle
returns (σi, Λi, Λ′i) to the adversary A.
• Output. Finally, A gives a pair (m, σ). If there exists
(1) V erify(pk,m, σ) = 1 and (2) m /∈ ω then the
experiment returns b = 1 meaning that A has won
the game. Otherwise the experiment returns b = 0
meaning that A has failed to forge a signature.
We define PrforgeA as the probability of A wins in the
above game. The probability PrforgeA is taken over the coin
tosses of A and KeyGen.
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Definition 1. A signature scheme Π is (, τ, q)-
existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen message
attacks with continual leakage if for all (, τ, q)-adversaries
A where τ is the most running time of A and PrforgeA
is at least  and q is the most number of queries to or-
acle, the probability Pr(b = 1) in the experiment Sign-
LeakΠ(A, k, λ) is negligible(as a function of the security
parameter k).
3.4 Generic Bilinear Group Model
The “generic algorithm” was first proposed by Shoup,
in which the group elements are encoded as unique binary
strings and the special properties of the encodings of the
group elements are not exploited. This model was extended
to the generic bilinear group [27] where a bilinear map is
involved.
The specific details about the generic bilinear group
model have been formalized by Galindo in [27], where
representations of bilinear group elements in G and GT
are given by random bijective maps σ : Zp → Ξ and
σT : Zp → ΞT . Ξ and ΞT are sets of bit strings respectively.
There are oracles O, OT and Oe that can compute the group
operations in G and GT and the evaluation of the bilinear
map e. These oracles accept the representations in Ξ and
ΞT as inputs and generate such representations as outputs,
which are defined as follows:
O(σ(a), σ(b)) = σ(a+ b mod p)
OT (σT (a), σT (b)) = σT (ab mod p)
Oe(σ(a), σ(b)) = σT (ab modp)
The generator g of the group G satisfies g = σ(1) and
the generator gT of GT satisfies gT = e(g, g) = σT (1). Since
the representation of g is public, thus, users can efficiently
generate random elements in both G and GT .
We extend the generic bilinear group model [27] slightly
to the asymmetric pairing setting denoted as e : G1 ×G2 →
GT where G1 6= G2. Representations of group elements
in G1, G2 and GT are given by random bijective maps
σ1 : Zp → Ξ1, σ2 : Zp → Ξ2 and σT : Zp → ΞT , respec-
tively. Moreover, the generator P1 ofG1 satisfies P1 = σ1(1),
and the generator P2 of G2 satisfies P2 = σ2(1), and the
generator PT of GT satisfies PT = e(P2, P1) = σT (1). The
adversary A has accesses to these generic group oracles,
namely O1, O2 and OT . Let τ1, τ2 and τT be the number
of queries of A to group oracles O1, O2 and OT . We define
the query form ofA and the response form of generic group
oracles as follows. Let the inputs of the ith query ofA to OT
be of the form (Xi, Yi), where Xi and Yi are representations
in ΞT . And let the response of the generic group oracle
OT to the ith query be the representation Zi, such that
Zi = Xi×Yi. For convenience, all the above mentioned rep-
resentations, including inputs and outputs are denoted as
R1, R2, ..., R3τT , meaning that (X1, Y1, Z1, X2, Y2, Z2...) =
(R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, ...). The query form of A to O1, O2
and their response form are similar to OT , except the re-
sponse of O1 and O2 is Zi = Xi + Yi. Three tables LT , L1
and L2 defined below are maintained to reserve these group
element representations obtained from O1, O2 and OT .
LT = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, ...R3i : 1 ≤ i ≤ τT }
L1 = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, ...R3i : 1 ≤ i ≤ τ1}
L2 = {R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, ...R3i : 1 ≤ i ≤ τ2}
Since A can also query group oracles with representa-
tions not previously appeared in the above tables, called
independent representations, we introduce another three
tables in order to maintain the consistences of the repre-
sentations of the group elements.
QT = {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, ...Qt : 1 ≤ t ≤ 2τT }
Q1 = {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, ...Qt : 1 ≤ t ≤ 2τ1}
Q2 = {Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, ...Qt : 1 ≤ t ≤ 2τ2}
where Q1, Q2, ...Qt are received by generic bilinear group
oracles in order. It is clear that if the total query number
to oracle OT is τT , then t ≤ 2τT because the number
of independent inputs is at most twice of the number of
queries. The same conclusions apply to oracles O1 and O2.
Lemma 1. An observer of the interactions between
A and generic bilinear group oracles can determine, for
each representations, a sequence of integers, namely ai=
(ai1, ai2, ..., ait) with the property that Ri =
∑t
j=1 aijQj in
group G1 and G2 or Ri =
∏t
j=1Q
aij
j in group GT . We call
ai the combination of Ri in generic bilinear group G1, G2
and GT .
Brown [28] proved this lemma in a single group G, and
it holds naturally in G1,G2 and GT . Thus, lemma 1 holds.
If there exist two different combinations aj 6= ak satisfy-
ing Rj = Rk, we call that a collision appeared in tables L1,
L2 and LT . When a collision is found in LT , the observer
can conclude
uaj−ak = 1 mod p (1)
Similarly, when a collision appears in L1 or L2, the observer
has
(aj − ak) · u = 0 mod p (2)
With these equations, the observer is able to infer some
knowledge of the set u. Let ri ∈ Zp be the unique unknown
value such that σT (ri) = Ri, then the observer can obtain
some information ri where ri = ai·u in G1 and G2 or
ri =u
ai in GT .
Lemma 2 [28]. Suppose there are at most m oracle
queries, the probability of a collision occurring in a generic
bilinear group for Zp is at most 3
(m+1
2
)
/p.
4 OUR CONSTRUCTION
4.1 Basic idea
To make the original ECDSA signature scheme
continual-leakage-resilient, we apply the techniques due to
Galindo et al [27]. That is, instead of managing a single
secret key, the secret key is divided into two shares which
are stored in different parts of the memory. The signing
algorithm is divided into two steps as well. We deal with
the continual leakage of the secret key by refreshing the two
shares of the secret key after each signature round regularly
to keep the internal secret key stateful.
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4.2 Detailed construction
The details of the proposed leakage-resilient paring-
based ECDSA signature are as follows, in which i denotes
the i th round of signing.
Setup(k): On input a security parameter k, this algorithm
randomly picks a pairing friendly curve C defined on
the finite field Zp and outputs the corresponding bilinear
pairing generic groups G1, G2 and GT , and a bilinear map
e: G1 × G2 = GT . The operations of G1 and GT are
denoted as + and × respectively. This algorithm chooses
a base point P1 of G1 and a base point P2 of G2, and
computes PT = e(P1, P2). H : {0, 1}? → Zp denotes
a secure hash function and f (R) = R mod p denotes
an almost invertible reduction function where R ∈ GT
defined in [28]. The system parameters are denoted as
para = (G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, PT , e, p, C,H, f).
KeyGen(k, para): On input the security parameter k and
the system parameters para, this algorithm randomly picks
two integers d, l0 ∈ Zp, and computes S0 = l0P1, S0′ = (d−
l0)P1 and Q = P dT . The public key is pk = (P1, P2, PT , Q)
while the initial secret key is sk = (S0, S0
′).
Sign1(Si−1,mi): On input the first part of the (i − 1)th
secret key, to sign a message mi, this algorithm randomly
selects integer li, ti ∈ [0, p − 1] and computes Si = Si−1 +
liP1, Rs = P
ti
T , rs = f(Rs), hs = H(mi), and wi = tiP1 +
hsrsSi.
Sign2(S′i−1, hs, rs, wi): On input the second part of the
(i − 1)th secret key, this algorithm computes S′i = S′i−1 −
liP1, and si = wi + hsrsSi
′. The signature on the message
mi is σi = (rs, si).
Verify(pk,mi, σi): On input a message-signature pair
(mi, σi) where σi = (rs, si), this algorithm computes
hv = H(mi) and Rv = e(si, P2) ×Q−(hvrs). Output a bit 1
to indicate the signature is valid if f(Rv) = rs. Otherwise,
output 0 meaning the signature is invalid.
5 SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the security of our construction
against adaptive chosen message attack under continual
leakage setting in the generic bilinear group model via a
sequence of games. To do this, we firstly prove the security
of our scheme denoted as Π against (Γ-time,0-query) adver-
sary called a passive adversary under no leakage environ-
ment through a game G1. Then, we prove security against a
(Γ-time,q-query) adversary called an active adversary under
no leakage setting through a game G2. It is clear that the
attack power of the adversaries in G2 is stronger than that
of in G1. More precisely, except the generic group oracles
O1, O2 and OT , A can also query a signing oracle to obtain
polynomial signatures of messages. Next, we prove security
against an active adversary under the continual-leakage
setting through a game G3. In this game, the adversary A
can not only obtain the representations of group elements
and signatures of messages but also can get some leaked
knowledge of the internal secret key.
5.1 Proof under no leakage setting
We firstly provide the unforgeability proof of our scheme
against a passive adversary, and then, we give a proof
against an active adversary in this part.
Against a passive adversary.
Theorem 1. If there exists an (, τ, 0)-adversary A that
can forge a valid signature of our scheme Π in the generic
bilinear group model, then we can construct an (′, τ ′)-hash-
inverter IH where
′ ≥ − 9
(τ ′+1
2
)
/p
τ ′
. (3)
Proof. In order to construct a hash inverter IH , we use
the adversary A as a sub-routine.
In the generic bilinear group model, the functions σT ,
σ1 and σ2 behave randomly. Just like hash functions are
controlled by the challenger in the random oracle model, σT
is controlled by IH in the generic bilinear group model. With
this simulation, we describe the response of IH to group
oracle queries as follows.
Query to OT : Upon receiving an independent input
Ri = Qj for some i, j from A, the oracle OT selects a
random uj ∈ Zp \ {r1, ...ri−1} and sets σT (uj) = Qj .
OT adds Qj into the table QT and adds uj to u. If OT
receives a dependent input Ri = Rk for some k < i, it sets
ri = rk. Before OT outputs the response Z3i, it first com-
putes a3i = ai + ai+1 where ai and ai+1 can be determined
from A’s two inputs. Then it computes r3i =
∏t
j=1 u
a3i,j
j .
Next, it compares r3i with {r1, ..., r3i−1}, which are already
in the table LT . If r3i = rk for some k < 3i, then OT
responds with Rk. If r3i 6= rk for all k < 3i then OT selects
randomly R3i ∈ ΞT \ {R1, ..., R3i−1} and appends it into
the table LT .
Query toO1 andO2:A’s queries to generic group oracles
O1 and O2 are similar to queries to OT . A difference is
that O1 and O2 computes the pre-image as r3i =a3i·u=∑t
j=1 a3i,j ·Qj .
Description of game G1: We describe a reduction game
from an (, τ, 0)-adversary A to a (′, τ ′)-hash-inverter IH
of the hash function H . More precisely, if A can forge a sig-
nature in probability , then IH can invert H in probability
′.
The input to IH is a random element h ∈ [0, p − 1]
as a challenge, and the goal of IH is to find M such that
H(M) = h. To findM , IH invokes the adversaryA and let it
interact with a modified simulation of generic group oracle
OT . When A is invoked, it makes some queries to generic
group oracles. In the end,A outputs (M, (rs, s)), whereM is
an arbitrary message and (rs, s) is a signature for M valid
under the public key Q. Initially, we assume without loss
generality that the first independent representation in table
Q1 is the base point P1 in G1 and P1 = Q1 = σ1(1). And the
first independent representation in tableQ2 is the base point
P2 in G2 and P2 = Q1 = σ2(1). In the table QT , the first
independent representation is the signer’s public key Q and
Q = Q1 = σT (X) where X denotes the discrete logarithm
of the signer’s secret key.
To make sure the output message M of A is the answer
of the inverter IH , we introduce the following trick. We
conduct a modified simulation of the generic bilinear group
oracle OT . Moreover, we ensure that the modified version
of the oracle OT , from A’s perspective, is indistinguishable
from the standard version. Therefore, A would operate as if
it were communicating with a true generic group oracle.
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We modify a query from A to the generic group oracle
OT as follows. Recall that, all queries of A to OT have an
unique combination a. We consider that the ith query such
that ai+1 has the form (−y, |0) where y ∈ Zp, and ai+1 6= al
for l ∈ [1, i] and a3i = ai +ai+1 6= ak for k ∈ [1, 3i− 1]. We
call this i special. For this special i, we modify the way of
OT generating the output R3i as follows. When IH receives
the ith query to OT , say two inputs (Ri, Ri+1), OT sets
R3i = g(y · h−1 mod p), (4)
where g is the probabilistic inverse of f , which exists since f
is almost invertible. Moreover, since h is selected randomly
and uniformly from [0, p− 1], so is y · h−1 mod p. Thus,
the distribution of modified simulation R3i is indistinguish-
able from the uniform distribution over ΞT . As a result,A is
able to forge a signature (rs, s) for messageM as it normally
would with the true simulation.
Upon receiving the forgery (M, (rs, s)) from A, IH
computes Rv = e(s, P2) × Q−(H(M)·rs) using the method
of double-and-multiply among point elements in GT , with
additional n queries to the modified simulation of the
generic group oracle OT . After the last query, IH gives the
response R3(m+n) = Rv , which has a unique combination
av= ai+ai+1.
Note thatRv = e(s, P2)×Q−(H(M)·rs), which is assumed
to be the ith query of A to OT at this moment. Next
we present the response of OT to this query. Intuitively,
there are two possibilities for av. If e(s, P2) is an indepen-
dent representation then ai = (0|1) and av = (−H(M) ·
rs, 0, 0, ..., 1). Else if e(s, P2) = Rl for l < τT , then av = al
+(−H(M) · rs|0) = (al,1 − H(M) · rs, al,2, al,3, ..., al,t). If
av 6= al for all l < 3(m + n) then Rv = R3(m+n) 6= Rl for
l < 3(m + n). In this case, IH selects a representation Rv
from ΞT \ {RT1, RT2, ...R3(m+n)−1}. Since A’s forgery is
valid, so there is f (Rv) = rs. If Rv is selected randomly, the
probability of f (Rv) = rs is at most 3/(p−3(m+n)). There-
fore, we assume a3(m+n) = al for l < 3(m+ n). In this case
e(s, P2) is not an independent input. Because if it was inde-
pendent, the combination av = (0, H(M)rs, 0, ..., 1), which
has one more integers than al for l < 3(m+ n). So ai = ak
for k < i and av = al = (ak,1−H(M)·rs, ak,2, ak,3, ..., ak,t).
Obviously, al 6= ei, so Rl is not independent. Therefore, Rl
first appeared as an output, say Rl = R3g , for g ∈ [1, l − 2].
As a result al = a3g = a3(m+n). IH only modifies the
response of one of these queries, denoted as j. Moreover
this jth query was chosen randomly by IH before game. So
the probability of j = g is at least 1/m, assuming there has
been m queries until now. Because
Rv = R3j = g(h
−1 ·H(M) · rs)
and
f (Rv) = h
−1 ·H(M) · rs = rs,
so H(M) = h mod p and IH outputs M as the solution
to the given hash inverse problem, such that H(M) = h.
The probability ′ is bounded as follows. Certainly, we
need A to succeed, which occurs with probability . More-
over, the above proof assumes no collision occurs, so the
probability of collision occurs must be subtracted, which
is at most 9
(m+n+1
2
)
/p. What’s more, the aforementioned
proof requires j = g, which occurs with probability at least
1/m. So overall,
′ ≥ − 9
(m+n+1
2
)
/p
m
≥ − 9
(τ
2
)
/p
m
≥ − 9
(τ
2
)
/p
τ
.
Because
− 9(τ2)/p
τ
≥ − 9
(τ ′
2
)
/p
τ ′
,
we get
′ ≥ − 9
(τ ′
2
)
/p
τ ′
.
Against an active adversary.
Theorem 2. If there exists an (, τ, q)-adversary A that
can forge a valid signature of the proposed scheme Π, then
there exists an (′, τ ′)-collision-finder CH where
′ ≥ − 9
(
τ ′
2
)
/p (5)
Proof. The adversary A can adaptively choose mes-
sages to query signatures to CH . Let ω be the set of mes-
sages queried by A. For simplicity, we only describe the
differences between the proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Description of game G2:
In this game, we aim to construct a collision finder
CH using the adversary A. Similarly, A can interact with
a modified simulation of the generic group oracle OT .
The difference is that instead of choosing a random j and
modifying the response of the generic group oracle OT to
the jth query, CH now, for each output Z3i of the generic
group oracle OT , chooses a random message M˜i, computes
h˜i = H(M˜i) and uses h˜i and g to generate a random output
in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1. In this proof,
A can interact with a signing oracle. For each signing query
on a message Mˆi, CH selects a random signature (rˆsi, sˆi)
and A can query OT to validate this signature. We stress
that OT must be simulated by CH in such a way that the
queried signatures are valid, using the almost invertibility
of f . More precisely, when CH receives a query message
Mˆi, it will response A with a random signature (rˆsi, sˆi),
and at the same time, CH computes e(sˆi, P2), Q−H(Mˆi)·rˆsi
and stores them in the table LT . Furthermore, CH sets
Rv = e(sˆi, P2) × Q−H(Mˆi)·rˆsi = g(rˆsi) and puts it in the
table LT . Then when A queries OT with Rv to validate
that signature, A will obtain a value previously computed
by CH . Obviously, this signature is valid with the almost
invertibility of function f . On the other hand, when A
queries OT with special inputs Xi and Yi, CH selects a
random message M˜i and responds A with g(H(M˜i)−1 · y)
where y ∈ [1, p − 1] is the first integer in combination aYi .
Eventually, if A outputs a valid forgery (rs, w) for M , then
there exists f (Rv) = rs. We describe the generation of Rv as
follows. In the modified simulation, CH selects a random M˜
and computes Rv = g(H(M˜)−1 · (H(M) · rs)). To achieve
f (Rv) = rs, there is H(M˜) = H(M). So overall, under no
collision environment, there are two possibilities for A to
forge a valid signature. One is H(M) = H(M˜) and another
is H(M) = H(Mˆ). Clearly, by the definition of a forgery,
there is M 6= Mˆ . Furthermore, as the distribution of M
is uniform and M˜ is selected randomly, so is M 6= M˜ .
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Thus, if A succeeds, then CH can find two messages (M
,M˜) or (M,Mˆ) with the same hash value. The probability ′
is bounded by ′ ≥ − 9(τ ′2 )/p.
5.2 Proof under leakage setting
In this proof, we further strengthen the attack power of
the adversary A. That is, in addition to group elements,
signature queries of adaptively chosen messages, A can
also obtain leakages of secret keys used in computing those
signatures.
Theorem 3. Let A be an (, τ, q)-adversary that can forge
a valid signature of Π, then we can construct an (′, τ ′)-
collision-finder CH where
′ ≥ − τ
′2
p
22λ. (6)
Description of game G3:
In game G2, the advantage ofA is bounded by its success
probability conditioned on the event that no collision has
occurred in the lists consisting of elements of G1, G2 and
GT . Note that the proof under non-leakage setting in G2 and
leakage setting in G3 would be the same conditioned on the
fact that a collision has not occurred. The reason is that in the
event of no collision, in order to forge a valid signature the
adversary has to find a collision of the hash function. Hence,
the success probability of A against scheme Π in and not in
leakage setting is same as that in the event of no collision. In
the leakage setting, because A has access to leakage oracles
fi(sk) and hi(sk) during the ith signature computation, then
in adversary’s view the secret key is no longer uniformly
distributed. Thus, the probability that a collision occurs in
the leakage setting is increased by a factor of at most 22λ.
Hence A can now cause collisions among representations
in tables LT , L1 and L2 with the increased probability. The
output of each leakage function is at most λ bits. So overall,
there would be at most 2λ bits leaked. So in the view of the
adversary, the secret key would only have a min-entropy
logp− 2λ.
According to Lemma 2, the probability of a collision
occurring is increased to
9
(m+1
2
)
p
22λ. (7)
The probability ′ of CH in leakage setting is bounded as
′ ≥ − 9
(m+1
2
)
p
22λ ≥ − τ
′2
p
22λ
6 IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this section, we show the implementations of the
proposed leakage-resilient signature algorithm.
6.1 Environment
We implemented the proposed scheme on a laptop with
4.00 GB RAM, 64-bit Win 7 operating system and a phone
with 4.04GB RAM, Android 7.1.1 operating system respec-
tively. The processors of the laptop and phone are Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-2450M CPU @ 2.50GHz and 8 the highest
2.45GHZ respectively. The implementation was conducted
TABLE 1: Time cost of our signature scheme
Sub-Algorithm Setup KeyGen Sign Verification
Laptop 23.268 ms 1.156 ms 11.083 ms 6.083 ms
Phone 40.663 ms 12.380 ms 39.083 ms 14.526 ms
with C++ projects and a powerful Miracl library, which re-
alizes kinds of cryptographic operations such as big integers
and elliptic curve group operations. And then compile the
C++ projects in Visual Studio 2012.
6.2 Implementation results
In the implementation, we choose the security level as
AES-80 bit, and employ Cocks-Pinch curve1 y2 = x3− 3x+
B, with the embedding degree 2 over a finite field GF (p)
where p = 3 (mod 4).
To test the efficiency of our scheme, we executed four
sub-algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Sign and V erify, where
Sign includes Sign1 and Sign2. Each sub-algorithm was
run 50 times on the laptop and the phone respectively.
The average running time of the sub-algorithms to sign a
single message is shown in Table 1. The Setup algorithm
generates the public parameters of the construction which
on average consumes 23.268 ms on the laptop and 40.663
ms on the phone. For KeyGen, it is obvious that the most
expensive operations are 2 point multiplications in G1 and
1 exponentiation in GT . On average, the KeyGen algorithm
costs 1.156 ms on the laptop and 12.380 ms on the phone. In
the signature computation, the most expensive operations
are 5 point multiplications in G1, which takes about 11.08
ms on the laptop and 39.09 ms on the phone respectively
for the Sign1 and Sign2 algorithms together. To validate
a signature, the most expensive operations in algorithm
V erify are 1 bilinear map and 1 exponentiation operation.
The V erify takes on average 6.083 ms on the laptop and
14.526 ms on the phone.
In the experiment, the implementation results for Setup
and KeyGen algorithms are almost constant both on laptop
and phone, that is on average 23.268 ms and 1.156 ms on
the laptop and 40.663 ms and 12.380 on the phone. This
is consistent with the empirical analysis since these two
algorithms are independent of the signed messages. We also
tested the time cost of the Sign and V erify algorithms
by increasing the number of signed messages from 1 to
10. The implementation results on the laptop and phone
are demonstrated in Fig. 2 3. As expected, the time cost of
both the Sign algorithm and the V erify algorithm increases
almost linearly with the increase of the number of signed
messages. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis of
the proposed scheme too since once a signed message is
given, its hash value is determined and all the operations of
the Sign and V erify algorithms are determined.
7 CONCLUSION
Information leakage especially secret key leakage is a
serious threat in a number of IoT applications. In this paper,
1. Methords for constructing Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves,
http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/conferences/2006/ecc2006/freeman.pdf
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Fig. 3: Time cost of Verify algorithm
we propose LRCoin, a kind of leakage-resilient cryptocur-
rency based on Bitcoin, secure even part of the signing key
is exposed as a helpful supplement of Bitcoin. LRCoin can
be applied to the applications where information leakage
is inevitable to make the payment of data trading in IoT
more reliable. The core of LRCoin is a leakage-resilient
digital signature for signing transactions in the network. We
propose a concrete construction of an efficient bilinear-based
continual-leakage-resilient ECDSA signature algorithm as
the building block of LRCoin. We prove the unforgeability
of the proposed signature algorithm in the generic group
model. The implementations on the labtop and the phone
demonstrate the efficiency and the practicability of our
proposal.
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